CDT on crypto bills

["Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+@CMU.EDU>]

---------- Forwarded message begins here ----------

Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 23:12:49 +0100
To: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+@CMU.EDU>
From: jseiger@cdt.org (Jonah Seiger)
Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced
Cc: Fight Censorship Mailing List <fight-censorship+@andrew.cmu.edu>,
        jim@RSA.COM

If you read our statement, you will see that we agree completely with EFF &
Jim that the new crime is unnecessary and needs to be addressed.

As for the second issue, I understand EFF's concerns, and this is
definitely an issue that needs further clarification and discussion. But
you should note that the bills do not in any way impose key escrow (and
only the Senate bill contains these provisions anyway).

In fact,the legislation does precisely the opposite in two ways:

1. The bill explicitly affirms the rights of Americans to use any form of
   cryptography they choose domestically.

2. By directly attacking export controls, the legislation undermines the only
   lever the Administration has in imposing Clipper and Clipper II. The Clipper
   and Clipper II policies are based on the assumption that the market in most
   cases will support only one version of a particular crypto application.
   By encouraging only the export of cyrpto w/key escrow mechanisms, the
   Administration believes that they can force the domestic market to adopt
   escrow as well. This has not worked yet, but it *has* forced a stalemate
that
   has led to a very little privacy and security for the Net.

   By undermining the only leverage the Administration has for left to impose
   key escrow domestically (beyond an explicit effort to ban it
outright), these
   bills effectively remove the current threat of a government imposed domestic
   escrow crypto policy, and allow the market for strong cryptography to
   flourish.

So again, CDT believes that this legislation represents the best
opportunity we have had yet to provide the Internet with the privacy
protections and security it desperately needs. There are most certainly
areas that we would like to see changed and/or clarified, but that should
not overshadow the important opportunity these bills represent.

Jonah

>Thanks for the clarification, Jonah. I agree the bill will undercut
>Clipper II, but I share the concerns outlined in the EFF statement,
>which says the bill:
>
>  *  Makes it a new crime to "use encryption to obstruct justice", with
>     5-10 year sentences, plus fines.  In plain language, this is a
>     extra criminal charge that can be applied when police are frustrated
>     in an investigation but happen to catch someone breaking the law in
>     some other way.
>
>  *  Provides a legal infrastructure for key escrow, a system in which
>     all users' keys are copied to permit government access.
>
>Jim Bidzos is the CEO of RSA Data Security, and he supports Leahy's
>bill. His mail is attached below.
>
>-Declan
>
>---------- Forwarded message begins here ----------
>
>Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 13:26:39 PST
>From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
>Message-Id: <9603052126.AA19534@RSA.COM>
>Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>
>I'm in favor of the Bill because it specifically prevents, by law, the
>US Govt from mandating key escrow. Also because it would, by law,
>force export control of crypto out of the Dept. of State and into the
>Dept.  of Commerce, effectively allowing any crypto used in the US and
>"widely available" to be exported. (The bill does a few other things.
>One, it provides for criminal penalties for key holders who abuse
>their role as an escrow agent, assuming anyone *chose* to use key
>escrow.  Second, it makes the use of encryption -any encryption- a
>crime if used in the commission of or support of any criminal
>activity. I think the bill would be better off without these
>provisions, but I suspect this is an attempt to give the
>administration something.)
>
>I anticipate that the Administration, led by the intelligence and law
>enforcement interests, will vigorously lobby against this bill...

--
Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst          Center For Democracy and Technology
<jseiger@cdt.org>                          1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100
                                                    Washington, DC  20006
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