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(Fwd) Re: Secure anonymouse server protocol: comments please
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From: [email protected] (Adamsc)
To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
On Mon, 2 Sep 1996 19:24:23 +0000, [email protected] wrote:
>This system has 1 huge fault, we can encrypt a uses ID with the
>servers public key to see what his ID in the encrypted database is
>and therefore identify him, maybe we need two seperate server public
>keys, and when IDs come in encrypted with key1 (the one it releases)
>it decrypts with secretkey1 then encrypts with publickey2 (the one it
>or maybe we can just hash and sign the IDs in the database?
>as I said it`s very sketchy, I made most of this up as I wrote it so
>if you must tear it to pieces please do so constructively, it could
>be the route to a secure system....
How about this: do the exchange *every* time. Never reuse a key. That way at
most 1 message could be easily snagged (by seeing where it goes). It'd be
processor intensive, but it avoids the whole reuse problem - where you store an
ID to be used to retrieve all messages. Also, software could be written to do
the key computation solely on the client - after all, the server doesn't care
if they pass themselves a dud key, right? Let them crunch it. Put all those
Pentiums to work!
Better idea, I hadn`t thought of that, anyone else care to comment on
a way to solve this? - how did the nymservers do it????
Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security
Paul Bradley, [email protected]
"Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"
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