DoDeclassifying Crypto

[John Young <jya@pipeline.com>]

From: DOD5200.1-R: "Information Security Program"
January, 1997

Appendix D

Special Procedures for Use in Systematic and Mandatory
Review of Cryptologic Information

1. General guideline: Cryptologic information uncovered in
systematic or mandatory review for declassification of 25-
year old government records is not to be declassified by
other than the National Security Agency. The information may
concern or reveal the processes, techniques, operations, and
scope of signals intelligence (SIGINT), which consists of
communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic
intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence (FISINT), or it may concern the components of
Information Security (INFOSEC) which consists of
communications security (COMSEC) and computer security
(COMPUSEC), including the communications portion of cover
and deception plans. Much cryptologic information is also
considered "Foreign Government Information" as defined in
Para. 1.1(d) of the Executive Order 12958.

2. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be
an easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic
information, as follows:

  a. Those that relate to INFOSEC: In documentary form,
they provide   COMSEC/COMPUSEC guidance or information. Many
COMSEC/COMPUSEC documents and materials are accountable
under the Communications Security Material Control System.
Examples are items bearing telecommunications security
(TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying material for use in
enciphering communications and other COMSEC/COMPUSEC
documentation such as the National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee or is predecessor
organization, COMSEC/COMPUSEC Resources Program documents,
COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment
System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.

  b. Those that relate to SIGINT: These appear as
reports in various formats that bear security
classifications, frequently followed by five-letter
codewords, for example, World War II's ULTRA, and often
carry warning caveats such as "This document contains
codeword material" and "Utmost secrecy is necessary..." or
"Handle Via COMINT Channels Only" or "HVCCO" or "CCO."
Formats may appear as messages having addresses, "from" and
"to" sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or
without other kinds of intelligence and comment.

  c. Research, development, test, life cycle support,
planning, and evaluation reports and information that
relates to either COMSEC, COMPUSEC, or SIGINT.

3. Some commonly used words that help to identify
cryptologic documents and materials are "cipher," "code,"
"codeword," communications intelligence," or "COMINT,"
"special intelligence," "communications security," or
"COMSEC," "computer security or COMPUSEC," cryptanalysis,"
"crypto," cryptography," "cryptosystem," "cipher,"
"decipher," "decode," "decrypt," "direction finding,"
"electronic intelligence" or "ELINT," "electronic security,"
"encipher," "encode," "encrypt," "foreign instrumentation
signals intelligence" or "FISINT" pr "FIS"," "telemetry,"
"information systems security" or "INFOSEC," "intercept,"
"key book," "one-time-pad," "bookbreaking," "signals
intelligence" or "SIGINT," "signals security," "TEMPEST,"
and "traffic analysis" or "TA."

4. Special procedures apply to the review and
declassification of classified cryptologic information. The
following shall be observed in the review of such
information.

  a. INFOSEC (COMSEC and COMPUSEC) Documents and
Materials.

  (1) If records or materials in this category are
found in agency or department component files that are not
under INFOSEC control, refer them to the senior
COMSEC/COMPUSEC authority of the agency or department
concerned or return them, by appropriate channels, to the
address in item 4.c, below.

  (2) If the COMSEC/COMPUSEC information has been
incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency,
that information must be referred to the National Security
Agency/Chief Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) for review
before declassification occurs.

  b. SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT) Information.

  (1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a
document or record originated by a U.S. Government
cryptologic organization and is in the files of a non-
cryptologic agency or department, such material will not be
declassified. The material may be destroyed unless the
holding agency's approved records disposition schedule
requires its retention. If the material must be retained, it
must be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for
declassification when it becomes 25-years old or older.

  (2) If the SIGINT information has been
incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it
produces, referral of the SIGINT information to the NSA/CSS
for review is necessary prior to any declassification
action.

  c. COMSEC/COMPUSEC or SIGINT information which
requires declassification by the NSA/CSS should be sent to:

  Director, National Security Agency/
  Chief, Central Security Service
  ATTN: Information Policy Staff (N5P6)
  Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

----------

For full document:

  http://jya.com/dod52001r.htm  (315K)