Re: SAFE

[Lee Tien <tien@well.com>]

Here's what Prof. Froomkin said about SAFE on another list:

>What I want to know about SAFE is this:
>
>1.  Will it in effect federalize  huge chunks of state criminal law once
>crypto is ubiquitous in telephones, email, garage-door openers etc.?
>Every state crime will now have a federal component...
>
>2.  Will the federal crypto-use-in-furtherance-of-a-state-crime be a
>separate predicate offense for civil (and criminal?) RICO?
>
>3.  What will the five year term for this offense  do to the
>plea-bargaining dynamic in every garden variety crime.
>
>Recall my hypothesis:  crypto will be seamless and ubiquitous in N years,
>where  N is not large.  Especially if SAFE passes and export controls are
>removed.
>
>On balance, I oppose SAFE.   It's not worth it.


[I wonder:  how does SAFE interact with IPSEC and arrangements like S/WAN?
This is not, I think, merely the "willful furtherance" provision.  The "law
enforcement" access provision may be ambiguous for keys that are not
"private"; my understanding of IPSEC is that the key is in the possession
of the machine and not the user.  I'm unclear whether users have 4th A.
standing to challenge law enforcement access to such keys; there are lots
of 4th A cases where a person has no privacy interest in information
because it's been disclosed to another person, or is in another person's
control.  Of course, I probably don't understand how IPSEC works, so
corrections are welcomed.]

Lee