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A bigger quote from the RCMP's Technological Crime Bulletin, located at:
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/tcb3-3b.htm
[begin quote]
There are many anonymous re-mailers in operation across the Internet. To
use one of these services, a person must send an e-mail message to the
re-mailer, who will, in turn, send a return message which will include a user
ID for this anonymous service. You can now send a message to any
e-mail address via this server and receive responses without divulging your
true identity. Particularly privacy-conscious individuals have been known
to loop their e-mail through two or more anonymous re-mailers to hide
their tracks completely. Couple this with data encryption, and you have an
exceptionally secure e-mail system.
However, re-mailers may not be as secure as once thought. For example,
the person who runs the re-mailer has the capability to discover who you
are and to read and record all messages sent. The Internet re-mailer could
be a government sting operation or a criminal enterprise designed to
entrap people. Hackers can break into the re-mailer and read all of the
e-mail traffic.
Law enforcement must be aware of the existence of anonymous
re-mailers, as they provide a cheap, efficient, and secret way of
communication for criminal groups. Although there are few documented
cases of this form of communication among criminal organizations, there is
no doubt that the potential is present. But the news to law enforcement
may not be all bad. It may be possible for law enforcement to use
anonymous re-mailers as part of an ongoing operational plan. For
example, investigators could also loop their e-mail messages through
re-mailers to disguise their identity. This could have excellent application in all types of undercover investigations.
[End quote]
This quote, while not the entire page, shows that LEOs are not quite as clueless as they have been in the past. In particular, the author seems to have a functional grasp of remailers, even though he describes a penet-style remailer. He recognises the inherent dangers of trusting a remailer, and even the value of setting up a remailer for use in a sting operation!
My favourite part is the last quoted paragraph, where he suggests that what's good for the goose is also good for the gander.
Better check Raph's list again for the existance of [email protected]
NotAMongerAtAll