Keep Feds' nose out of the Net, by Sen. John Ashcroft

[Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sun, 13 Jul 1997 22:53:17 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: fight-censorship-announce@vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: Keep Feds' nose out of the Net, by Sen. John Ashcroft


>Copyright (c)  1997 Investors Business Daily, All rights reserved.
>Investor's Business Daily - Guest Editorial (07/11/97)
>Encryption: Keep Feds' Nose Out Of The Net
>By SEN. JOHN ASHCROFT
>
>     J. Edgar Hoover would have loved this. The Clinton administration wants
>government to be able to read international computer communications -
>financial transactions, personal e-mail and proprietary information sent
>abroad - all in the name of national security. 
>
>In a proposal that raises obvious concerns about Americans' privacy,
>President Clinton wants to give agencies the keys for decoding all exported
>U.S. software and Internet communications. Such a policy also would tamper
>with the competitive advantage that our U.S. software companies currently
>enjoy in the field of encryption technology.
>     Not only would Big Brother be looming over the shoulders of
>international cybersurfers, he also threatens to render our state-of-the-art
>computer software engineers obsolete and unemployed.
>     Granted, the Internet could be used to commit crimes, and advanced
>encryption could disguise such activity. However, we do not provide the
>government with phone jacks outside our homes for unlimited wiretaps. Why,
>then, should we grant government the Orwellian capability to listen at will
>and in real time to our communications across the Web?
>     The protections of the Fourth Amendment are clear. The right to
>protection from unlawful searches is an indivisible American value.
>     The president has proposed that American companies and computer users
>supply the government with decryption keys to high-level encryption programs.
>Yet European software producers are free to produce computer encryption codes
>of all levels of security without providing keys to any government authority.
>     Buyers of encryption software value security above all else. They will
>ultimately choose airtight encryption programs - not those for which the U.S.
>government maintains keys.
>     In spite of this obvious fact, the president is trying to foist his
>rigid policy on the exceptionally fluid and fast-paced computer industry.
>Furthermore, recent developments in decryption technology cast doubt on the
>wisdom of any government meddling in this industry.
>     Two weeks ago, the 56-bit algorithm government standard encryption code
>that protects most U.S. electronic financial transactions, from ATM cards to
>wire transfers, was broken by a low-powered 90-megahertz Pentium processor.
>     In 1977, when this code was first approved by the U.S. government as a
>standard, it was deemed unbreakable. And for good reason - there are 72
>quadrillion different combinations in a 56-bit code. However, with today's
>technology, these 72 quadrillion different combinations can each be tried
>-it's only a matter of time and determination.
>     Two days after this encryption code was broken, however, the Senate
>Commerce Committee voted, in accordance with administration policy, to force
>American software companies to perpetuate this already compromised 56-bit
>encryption system.
>     Meanwhile, 128- bit encryption software from European firms is available
>to every Web user. Interestingly, European firms can import this supersecure
>encryption technology (originally developed by Americans) to the U.S., but
>U.S. companies are forbidden by law from exporting these same programs to
>other countries.
>     So to move forward with the president's policy or the Commerce
>Committee's bill would be an act of folly, creating a cadre of government
>peeping Toms and causing severe damage to our vibrant software industries.
>Government would be caught in a perpetual game of catch-up with whiz-kid
>code-breakers and industry advances.
>     Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., has signaled his objection to both
>proposals. He and I would like to work to bring to the floor a version of the
>encryption legislation by Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont. Burns' bill closely
>resembles the popular House encryption bill sponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte,
>R- Va. Both measures would not require sharing of keys with the goverment.
>     In essence, these proposals would give U.S. encryption software
>manufacturers the freedom to compete on equal footing in the worldwide
>marketplace. They would set up a quasi-governmental board for the industry to
>decide encryption bit strength based on the current level of international
>technology.
>     U.S. companies are on the front line of online technologies - the value-
>added industries of the future.
>     The best policy for encryption technology is one that can rapidly react
>to breakthroughs in decoding capability and roll back encryption limits as
>needed. The Burns and Goodlatte proposals would accomplish this. In contrast,
>the Clinton administration's unnecessary and invasive interest in
>international e-mail is a wholly unhealthy precedent, especially given this
>administration's track record on FBI files and Internal Revenue Service
>snooping.
>     Every medium by which people communicate can be exploited by those with
>illegal or immoral intentions. Nevertheless, this is no reason to hand Big
>Brother the keys to unlock our e-mail diaries, open our ATM records or
>translate our international communications.##
>
>     John Ashcroft is a Republican U.S. senator from Missouri and a member of
>the Senate Commerce Committee.