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Re: Exports and criminalizing crypto

At 4:08 PM -0700 9/25/97, John Smith wrote:
>>From: Tim May <[email protected]>
>>J. Random Hotmail User, you'd better learn to read the text of the
>>you so blithely think are OK.
>Well, I read the text of the bill, and here is part of what it says:

Congratulations on now having read the bill you endorse earlier today. You
should have read it before endorsing it. Now you are apparently grasping at
straws to reinforce the conclusions you have already reached, that SAFE is
a good bill and will let Ian and others freely export their products.

As for quoting just one section, there is always danger in this. For one
thing, the paragraphs preceeding the ones you quote say:

"Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the Secretary shall have
exclusive authority to control exports of all computer hard ware, software,
and technology for information security (including encryption), except that
which is specifically designed, or modified for military use, including
command, control, and intelligence applications."

Paragraph (3) is the one which imposes a standard for export which is quite
opposite the "no license" you apparently believe is the overriding

>`(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES- No validated license may be required,
>    pursuant to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the International
>Emergency Economic Powers
>    Act (but only to the extent that the authority of such Act is not
>exercised to extend controls
>    imposed under this Act), for the export or reexport of--
>          `(A) any software, including software with encryption
>               `(i) that is generally available, as is, and is designed
>for installation by the
>               purchaser; or
>               `(ii) that is in the public domain for which copyright or
>other protection is not
>               available under title 17, United States Code, or that is
>available to the public
>               because it is generally accessible to the interested
>public in any form;
>This sounds like it should cover the kind of crypto that we
>are talking about and that Ian Goldberg does.  It is generally
>available and installable by the purchaser (it's free) and
>it is in the public domain and generally accessible to the interested
>public, etc.  And see, there are no export licenses for this.

And you interpret Paragraph (3) in which way?

Even if Paragraph (3) did not exist, the allusion to the Trading With The
Enemy Act (which leads to the Munitions Act and the ITARs and, now, EARs)
and the Emergency Economic Powers Act would pretty much ensure that the
Feds could and would use SAFE to halt exports of a product they believed
would compromise national security, tax collection capabilities, etc.

>There is another part that has the stuff you were talking about
>re "diversion" and terrorism, but that is separate.  It
>is for software that is not generally accessible and installable
>by the purchaser and all that.  More specialized stuff, like custom
>packages.  But cypherpunks software is for everybody, and this bill
>should make it free to export.

Nonsense. Read the _entire_ text. Also read Declan's June article, which he
just sent to the list today.

The debate is not about export of "custom packages." Ask RSADSI. Ask
Netscape. Ask PGP Inc.

--Tim May

The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."