PGP in UK and GAK

[John Young <jya@pipeline.com>]

Responding to msg by anonymous-remailer@shell.portal.com () on 
Sun, 10 Sep  2:8  AM

[Snip]

>The person who told me about this also said something 
>about a  Department of Trade & Industry paper which 
>mentioned that the British  Government was going to 
>insist on key escrow for encryption.
>
>Anyone else in the UK heard anything about this?


   Picking up the possible mandated use of key escrow in the
   UK:

   There was chat at the NIST key escrow meeting that low-bit
   key escrow may be the global policy in the works among
   governments. With a blanket outlawing of all non-escrowed
   systems. And, that US key escrow and 64-bit export policy
   is a harbinger of domestic regulation.

   A fed at the B-2 breakout session imperiously barked the
   mantra chanted by several feds at the general meeting, "64-
   bit encryption is what industry asked for, why are you now
   complaining."

   To the counter-question, "what industry are you referring
   to?" the answer was always just "industry."

   The USG's latest key escrow policy, the NIST meetings and
   the Intellectual Cryptography Insitute's conference "Global
   Challenges" posted here may be the surfacing of a well-
   orchestrated government and "industry" collusion on this
   issue. Note the common ever-present attendees of both NIST
   and the ICI meetings.

   Certainly, some "industry" spokespersons like "Daughter of
   Clipper" Denning presume by their tone of writing that key
   escrow is on its way to supremacy, with only quibbling left
   on the criteria for acceptably "competitive" variations.

   The NIST handouts of industry players seem to bear this out
   as well, even as some join the public kibitzing. Perhaps
   their raz, and that of BSA, is just a diverting smokescreen
   to induce complacency -- or squeaking wheels to get USG
   attention for sweetheart contracts.

   Maybe they've already met privately with USG reps to get
   rewarded with a piece of the PGP/non-escrow clamp-down biz
   -- more venerable suckling of national security kabooty as
   advised by smart-varmints like ex-NSA Mr. Stewart
   Abercrombie Baker, Every-meet-attending-Esq.

   I wonder if Mrs. Denning and Mr. Baker are advising their
   sweating crypto clients, "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em,
   the international escrow train is leaving the station,
   better get on before it's too late."

   While fretting of derailment by hackers, or worse, by
   international security agencies paranoid of gov-biz
   complicity to take over the "if you knew what I knew"
   crypto-protected cornucopia.

   Wonder who's really engineering this GAK Limited runaway?

   Does anybody know David Kahn well enough to ask what he's
   finding as NSA Visiting Historian -- in the archives and in
   the job-insecure-spook resumes heat-seeking crypto fires?