Re: "random" number seeds vs. Netscape

["Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>]

Phil Karlton writes:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> > This is true. However, you must get 128 bits of entropy into the MD5
> > -- this can be accompanied by as much junk as you like, but if there
> > are at least 128 bits of entropy fed in, the MD5 process will distil
> > it into what you want.
> 
> My assumption ws that if we conservatively counted at least 300 bits
> of entropy, we would have 128 for sure. Not very scientific,

Its not a bad way to go. You have to make sure that you have at least
that many bits of ENTROPY, however. Stuff like keystroke timings
should only be thought of as handing you a bit or so per click.

> > You might want to read RFC 1750,
> 
> Did that. It talks about a lot of the pitfalls. Unfortunately it
> does not address (nor can it realistically be expected to address)
> details of what to look for on a particular version of an OS running
> on some particular platform.

That is true. 

> > PC timers inherently run at Mhz speed -- they interrupt every 100th of
> > a second but you can get finer resolution by querying the clock
> > chip. Does Windows let you do this?
> 
> I don't know, but I'll forward this on to our PC guys. It might be a
> portability problem.

It actually shouldn't be -- every PC has the same timer chip or a
compatible one. The real question is whether Windows lets you get the
data out.

> > I wouldn't do that, since it forces you to have a dependancy on
> > executing a subprocess.
> 
> We try to be careful about dealing with the subprocess failing to run.

Also be especially careful about how you run the thing! Don't use
popen or anything like it!

> > >       System specific info such as hardware serial number or
> > >       system id.
> 
> > By definition, that isn't random. Don't use it.
> 
> It doesn't hurt. It's also information that is not available to the external
> evesdropper. Other than execution time, why should I remove it from the list
> of bits being fed into the hash?

You have to build to the model of someone who knows everything there
is to know about the machine. Why? Well, many pieces of information
can in fact be extracted -- license servers and SNMP agents are a way
to extract things like system IDs. (Overly chatty SNMP extensions and
similar stuff make me nervious about using too much ps based entropy,
by the by.)

If you put PROM ID into the hash, don't count it as a source of bits
-- just think of it as something extra to throw in to make life harder
-- and heavily comment that it is not to be counted in the magic 300
bits you are trying to extract. Remember, plan for the worst, not the
best, and you will never have trouble if the threat model gets worse.

As a security consultant, I always emphasize to clients that you have
to plan for worst case -- always. That way you can sleep at
night. Always assume the adversary has a way to break the individual
components of your system.

When I build firewalls, I rig them so that both an outer filtering
router, a tightened down application gateway, and an inner filtering
router must all fail in order for people to break in. I build things
on the assumption of maximum hostility on all points. Because of this,
every time a security hole has been announced for the last couple of
years -- in CISCO firmware, in Sendmail, in anything -- I've been able
to sleep because I've known that only one of many layers of protection
has been breeched and I have a few hours to fix the one layer that is
broken.

When building things like this, BUILD PARANOID. It never hurts.

> > >     Multi-user Unix machines present a special problem. There are those
> > >     at Netscape that argue that anybody who has login access to your
> > >     machine may as well be considered to have root access. There are
> > >     enough known attacks that this is true to a large extent.  However,
> > >     I think we can do better than just giving up.
> > 
> > I agree. Don't run on the assumption that everyone has root --
> > otherwise you'll build something that produces less safety than it could.
> 
> I agree, but I have a hard arguing with those that asser that the security
> of UNIX is weak enough that given what we are doing for the patch it will
> be easier to become root from a logged in account than to hack the seed.

Always build belt-and-suspenders around any security system. Try to
make sure that there are as many ways as possible that things have to
fail before you get nuked. Throwing an impediment in the way of
non-root users is a good idea. You program it once and it protects
forever -- an excellent investment.

Perry