Re: netscape's response (source code review)

[John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>]

> > "Netscape has also begun to engage an external group of world-class
> > security experts who will review our solution to this problem before
> > it is sent to customers."
> > 	A group which offered to review the first version, but
> > Netscape refused.
>   Do you mean that cypherpunks offered to review the netscape code
> if only we made all the source available on the net?

I think "the group" was RSADSI, based on a remark of Jim Bidzos.
However, I do think that, like the S1 cipher, your code would get
examined for interesting features and flaws by the cypherpunks if you
released it.

>   We will be having at least some of our code reviewed by a
> wider audience, but I don't yet know which code, or how wide a review
> group.  If anyone has specific suggestions for pieces of code that
> you would like to see widely reviewed (such as RNG and seed generation)
> let me know.

It is becoming gradually clearer in cryptanalysis that you can't test
security of pieces in isolation.  Their interaction with the
surrounding code and protocols is key to their security.  Ross
Anderson's paper at Crypto last month was all about this (``Robustness
Principles for Public Key Protocols'').  There were also several
papers there that showed how you couldn't just treat hash functions
like MD5 as black boxes, since embedding them naively into signature
protocols made it possible to do things like turn a signed short
message into a signed longer (modified!) message.

So far the c'punks haven't done anything clever to your protocols;
they've exploited basic weaknesses in key length and key generation.
There's still a lot of potential in active attacks, three-cornered
attacks, replays, etc, that is unexplored.

>   I realize that some cypherpunks think that we should make all of
> our code publicly available.  In an ideal world that would be great,
> but we live in a world with politicians, crooks, lawyers, stockholders,
> etc...  Don't expect to see us posting our entire security
> library source code to cypherpunks.

Naah.  I think NCSA should've made Mosaic publicly available, because
they wrote it with our tax dollars.  And I hold it against them that
they started the trend of "zero-cost personal-use binaries but no
commercial use" that many Net users still confuse with Real Free
Software (free as in freedom).  But Netscape owns its code, it can do
whatever it wants with it.

I'd still encourage you to err on the side of release.

The strongest tendency in the security industry is for "security by
obscurity", i.e. if we just keep this quiet, nobody will figure it
out.  Customers, even less sophisticated than vendors, often let the
vendors get away with it.  But it doesn't stop the crooks, and
stopping the crooks is what your customers are paying you to do.  

Code that gets public scrutiny, like published scientific papers, gets
debunked and honed and made to really work.  Much faster than code and
ideas that only circulate in small, closed groups.  The reason
Kerberos V5 is a lot more secure than V4 is because its security
features and flaws could be publicly discussed.  Steve Bellovin wrote
a whole paper about what was wrong in V4, and lots of people got to
chew on that and think about how to fix it.

The question that only Netscape management can estimate is: what
damage would it risk to your business, if you released *this much*
crypto code instead of *that much*.  Particularly if you copyright it
and prevent commercial re-use without licensing, I doubt it will help
your competitors much.  There is the risk of revealing a flaw that makes
it easy to crack.  That has to be balanced against the risk of having
such a flaw and not noticing it for years.

And finally, I thought a marketing goal was to make your security
scheme (SSL) a standard throughout the industry?  In that case,
publishing it *and allowing* commercial use would encourage people to
adopt it -- which is what I think you want.

[We all realize that "publishing" crypto code is unconstitutionally
regulated by the State Department.  So there are logistics to the
release process.  But you are presumably solving them for the 128-bit
domestic version; you can use the same procedures to let people
download whatever crypto source code you release.]

	John Gilmore