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Re: Cryptanalysis of RC4 - Preliminary Results (Repeat)
At 01:01 PM 9/29/95 S, Andrew Roos <[email protected]> wrote:
>(This is a repeat because I posted the original 36 hours ago and it still
>hasn't bounced back to me.)
Hmmm - I got it yesterday, so it did go out.
>The attack is based on two particularly interesting three-byte key
>prefixes which have a high probability of producing PRNG sequences
>which start with a known two-byte sequence. The prefixes are:
>1. Keys starting with "00 00 FD" which have a 14% probability of
> generating sequences which start "00 00".
>2. Keys starting with "03 FD FC" which have a 5% probability of
> generating sequences which start "FF 03".
[much interesting work deleted]
It sounds like any application using RC4 with random session keys
should start by testing session keys and rejecting any that
start with 00 00 or 03 FD; it means doing 2**-15 more random key
generations, and reducing the brute-force space by 2**-15,
but it's a pretty small reduction.
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