Re: Future Remailers

[tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)]

>  I have a suggestion on building future remailers. Let's not
> overlook the idea of operating them "Out of band." At intervals (
> preferably random) it would be possible to transmit messages via
> the phone network, or spread spectrum, to other remailers.
> (encrypted links of course)( encrypted UUCP?) This would make
> traffic analysis more difficult.
> 
>  It would also be possible to bounce messages through diverters in
> other states, further hindering TA. This might also work well for
> random sources for one time pads.

> Brian Williams

Furthermore, the continuing expansion of "private" networks--LANs and
WANs, within companies, within households, within other entities that
no government can plausibly claim monitoring authority over--will make
Digital Telephony II and traffic analysis much harder to implement.

When Alice send her remailer traffic down the hallway over her own
Ethernet line to Bob, the confusion grows. Not necessariy any better
than would be had with more ideal mixes, but certainly this sort of
thing can only work to make traffic analysis more complicated.

(Yes, the authorities can monitor all messages. But imagine what
happens when a company with hundreds of PCs, workstations, multiple
mini-networks, etc., gets into the remailer business.)

The rapid growth of proprietary networks (such as the one linking me
to my next door neighbor) makes Digital Telephony almost
unenforceable.

--Tim May 


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