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> > The quick proof of why the initial and final permutations add nothing to
> > the security of DES is presented in an informal and quite obvious sidebar.
> Actually, I found the proof not completely convincing. It's really a
> proof that it doesn't strengthen the DES against a *known plaintext*
> attack, but there are other weaker attacks it may make marginally more
> difficult (or easier..); for instance, partially-known plaintext or
> some forms of verifiable plaintext.
I'm afraid I'm not quite following you here, could you expound a bit?
Ah:) Isn't it great to be talking about encryptions again?:)
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