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Re: Design proposal: crypto-capable generic interface
Adam Shostack wrote:
> A daemon per user, or per machine? Either way, I think you
> run into problems on a big multi-user machine. (Either its an extra
> process or two per person, or its a great target for attack &
One per user. I'm thinking that, most of the time, the daemon process
would only last as long as the application.
It is certainly true that if there were to be one daemon per machine,
the security requirements would be a lot greater, as it would no
longer be possible to rely on the operating system to get the file
permissions right, etc. On the other hand, the daemon process better
be done right, or your're in trouble anyway.
> Its an interesting proposal, but let me ask you this--Why is
> it better than a libpgp (or pgp.dll) that offers a variety of services
> to programs at multiple levels (ie, offers full one call RSA/IDEA
> encryption and compression, as well as ascii armoring, or offers each
> of those as a seperate function.
Exportability. There is a general feeling that a mailer program
with specific hooks to libpgp is going to have trouble with
exportablity (and forget about binaries), where a program that
supports a generic interface (the likes of .mailcap) is out of the
NSA's jurisdiction. Of course, this is speculation until we actually
get a ruling, but it sounds plausible enough to me to warrant spending
some time on design and implementation.
Your question brings up another point: if the daemon process is
going to run as the personal slave of the application, then why not a
dynamic library instead? Two reasons. First, on Unix anyway,
interprocess communication through domain sockets is a more mature,
robust, and portable technology than dynamically linked libraries. On
Windows, it's probably the other way around, and that's worth thinking
The real reason is, though, that the daemon and application should
naturally be distrustful of each other's address spaces. Can you see
Netscape shipping code that links in a Joe Random dll? Conversely, do
you want your PGP secret data structures sharing an address space with
one of Netscape's beta releases? Using two processes in two address
spaces solves this problem.
Jeff, if you're reading this, what do you think Netscape's chances
are for supporting such a protocol, assuming of course that there were
nicely implemented daemons, and that the protocol itself was going to
standards track? Is it something you'd be interested in?