Distributed co-operative theorem proving, anyone? - was Java

[fc@all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)]

> > taken on an impossible task. Marcus Ranum has noted that you can't
> > trust a program thats bigger than a couple of pages long, and I

Marcus agreed with a position founded on the work in the late 70s and
early 80s by many researchers on proving the security of operating
systems under the Bell-Lapadula model.  The main result I recall is that
a Cray-1 took 24 hours to prove the Simple Security Property about a
100-line limited-Pascal program used as the core of (I think it was)
UCLA-secure Unix.  Complexity goes up quickly with program size, and this
property is only one of many you might like to prove.

> For the general case this is true. To be able to trust larger systems, you
> need to not only be able to trust the individual 2 pagers, but to also be
> able to show that composing the sub units doesn't lose whatever property
> you're trying to do.
...
> Distributed co-operative theorem proving, anyone?

Let's go - I will provide the distribution mechanisms, and I think I
know someone who is interested in the theorem proof side.  I know of
several experts on theorum proving who may well pitch in.  What program
do you want to prove secure next (we're currently finishing up my secure
Web server).

...
> Real point of the message:
> 
> In my previous message, I left out some fundamental parts of the run-time 
> that need to be looked at carefully. The garbage collection needs to be 
> examined carefully. Normally GC algorithms are formally derived, so it's 
> the implementation that needs to be checked for. holes in the GC may be 
> too unpredictable to exploit for anything but core-dumping, especially since 
> java uses a mark-sweep conservative collector. 

The core dumping shows that Java can ALSO write files into the file
system, something it was claimed to NEVER be able to do! If you could
get the right name for the core file, and set up the first few bytes
right, ... 

> A more promising area of attack might be the Thread system. If the thread
> system can be confused, it might be possible to have an untrusted app
> start executing in the context of a trusted thread. This may or may not 
> be exploitable, depending on how much of the untrusted threads context 
> gets held over (call stack, etc), but could be fun if it works.

Why not start much simpler.  Write a Java program to disrupt services by
flooding the local network with garbage packets - or with some sort of
request it lets you write. How about a Java program that launches SATAN
probes against all reachable hosts?

-- 
-> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net
Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236